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Our Shrinking First Amendment: On the Growing
Problem of Reduced Access to Public Property for
Speech Activity and Some Suggestions for a Better
Way Forward
RONALD

J. KROTOSZYNSKI,

JR.*

Contrary to the central thesis of this Symposium on "Our Expanding
FirstAmendment, " this Article posits that the scope of certain First
Amendment protections actually has contracted, ratherthan expanded,
over time. More specifically, the Roberts and Rehnquist Courts have

issued decisions that significantlyrestrict access to publicpropertyfor
speech activity. Under the rubric of the public forum doctrine, less

publicproperty is available todayfor speech activity than was the case
under the precedents of the Warren andBurger Courts. Moreover, even
with respect to government property that constitutes a traditionalor
designatedpublicforum, thefederal courts have permittedgovernment
to burden, or even banish, speech activity through the adoption and
enforcement of time, place, and manner (TPM regulations. By way of
contrast, during the Warren and Burger Court eras, the federal courts
generally presumed that government property must be availablefor

speech activity; the burden fell squarely on the government to justify
denying access to publicpropertyfor FirstAmendment activities.

* John S. Stone Chair, Director of Faculty Research, and Professor of Law, University
of Alabama School of Law. Our Shrinking FirstAmendment constitutes part of a larger,
book-length project: The DisappearingFirst Amendment: On the Decline of Freedom of
Speech and the Growing Problem of Inequality Among Speakers (forthcoming Yale
University Press 2019). The author wishes to thank the editors of the Ohio State Law Journal
for inviting him to present an earlier draft of this Article at a symposium dedicated to
considering "Our Expanding First Amendment." I hope that the editors will not mind terribly
my contrarian thesis-namely, that the scope of the First Amendment's protections has
contracted, rather than expanded, in some important contexts-notably including access to
public property for speech activity. I also wish to thank the law faculties at the Cornell
University Law School, the University of Texas School of Law, the Emory University
School of Law, the University of Washington School of Law, the Ohio State University
Moritz College of Law, the University of Alabama School of Law, the Lewis and Clark Law
School, the Seattle University School of Law, and the University of Oregon School of Law,
which all hosted faculty workshops associated with this Article and my larger book-length
project. A number of individual legal scholars provided very useful, and constructive,
comments and suggestions on earlier iterations of this Article: David Anderson, Ash
Bhagwat, Mark Brandon, Caroline Mala Corbin, Mike Dorf, Michael Heise, Margot
Kaminski, Sandy Levinson, Lyrissa Lidsky, Gerry Moohr, Andy Morriss, Marty Redish,
Steven Shiffrin, Joel Schumm, David Super, Mark Tushnet, Chris Walker, Chris Wells, and
Tim Zick. The University of Alabama Law Foundation provided generous financial support,
in the form of summer research grants, which greatly facilitated my work on this scholarly
endeavor. Finally, the usual disclaimer applies: Any and all errors and omissions are the sole
responsibility of the author.
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This Article posits that the contemporary public forum doctrine, in
conjunctionwith the TPMdoctrine, vests too much discretionarypower
with government to squelch speech activity on public property. Instead
of using a rigid, categoricalapproachto decide whether government
must make public property availablefor speech activity, the federal
courts should instead use a functional approach to decide what
constitutes a public forum-essentially the approach used by the
Warren and Burger Courts. Simply put, public spaces compatible with
FirstAmendment activity should be availablefor such activity. Second,
federal courts should be less ready to sustain TPM regulationsparticularlywhen the context of their adoption suggests a censorial
motive. It is probably unrealistic to propose a complete return to the
open balancing test that prevailed under the Warren and Burger
Courts. Even ifthis is so, however, the publicforum and TPMdoctrines
could be reformed to create, literally, more breathingspacefor First
Amendment activities essential to sustainingthe project of democratic
self-government.
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1. INTRODUCTION: OUR SHRINKING FIRST AMENDMENT AND REDUCED
ACCESS TO PUBLIC PROPERTY FOR SPEECH ACTIVITY

Over time, the federal courts have become predictably and consistently less
willing to force government-at all levels-to make public property available
for First Amendment activities. 1 For would-be speakers who do not own
property suitable for holding a mass protest or rally-or even for a peaceful
picket or leafletting exercise-access to government-owned property is simply
essential to their ability to speak. To the extent that the government may ban
expressive activity from its property, would-be speakers will face the unenviable
task of finding a private property owner who is willing to make land available
to them for their protest. 2
1See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990) (holding that sidewalks
within a U.S. Post Office parking lot, adjacent to the main post office building, that were
generally open to postal service customers were not a public forum and could be closed to
speech activity); Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 1145, 1158-61 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 2009 (2016) (holding that the open public plaza in front of the U.S. Supreme Court
building "to be a nonpublic forum" and observing that the plaza's status as a nonpublic forum
"is unaffected by the public's unrestricted access to the plaza at virtually any time");
Oberwetter v. Hilliard, 639 F.3d 545, 552-54 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that the Jefferson
Memorial, in Washington, D.C., is not a public forum for First Amendment activities);
Boardley v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 615 F.3d 508, 515 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that
national parks are not presumptive public forums and that "to establish that a national park
(in whole or part) is a traditional public forum, Boardley must show that, like a typical
municipal park, it has been held open by the government for the purpose of public
discourse"); United States v. Kistner, 68 F.3d 218, 219, 222 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding that the
Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, commonly known as the "St. Louis Arch,"
constitutes a public forum, but nevertheless sustaining the National Park Service's creation
of five designated "free speech zones" within the park and limiting First Amendment activity
to these areas). Two principal problems exist. First, federal courts are broadly deferential to
government decisions to label a park or memorial a "non-public forum," which empowers
the government to essentially ban expressive activities from the venue. Hodge, 799 F.3d at
1157-58. Second, federal courts accept draconian regulations on speech activities within
traditional public forums that exist to advance interests in "tranquility" and "the safety and
attractiveness" of the government's property. Kistner, 68 F.3d at 222. Both the designation
of parks and monuments as nonpublic forums, and the aggressive use of time, place, and
manner regulations, significantly reduce the space available for speech activity. See infra
notes 14-16, 117-31 and accompanying text.
2 For example, Cindy Sheehan wished to protest President George W. Bush's Iraq War
policies in a direct and personal way-and was able to accomplish this objective when a
private property owner with land adjacent to the route used by President Bush's motorcade
going to and from his ranch in Crawford, Texas permitted her to use it for protest activity.
See Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush and the Protestor:Tale of2 Summer Camps, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
22, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/22/polities/bush-and-the-protester-tale-of-2summer-camps.html [https://perma.cc/CRE5-9QXK]. Sheehan had initially used the
shoulder of a county road for her protest, but the local government enacted a ban on such
activity on public property. See Associated Press, Mother's Antiwar ProtestPrompts New
Law, N.Y. TIMEs (Sept. 30, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/30/us/nationalbriefing-south-texas-mothers-antiwar-protest-prompts-new-law.html
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For a variety of reasons, however, private property owners are not apt to
respond with alacrity to requests to use their property for various forms of social,
economic, or political protest activity. 3 ft should not be surprising that private
companies operating shopping malls, hotels, theaters, amusement parks, and the
like generally would prefer to avoid the potential controversy of being
associated with highly unpopular causes and speakers. 4
Of course, if one owns property suitable for speech activity, or has the
ability to rent property to engage in speech activity, lack of access to
government-owned property does not matter. So too, if the speech activity in
question is highly popular and uncontroversial, both government and private
property owners are likely to be willing to host it voluntarily.5 For example, the
organizers of a mass participation event to raise funds for breast cancer research
are likely to have an easier time finding public or private space for a rally than
the Ku Klux Klan or Nazi Party. Accordingly, the burden of declining access to
public property for speech activity falls much more heavily on some speakers
[https://perma-cc/LJK2-PKKS] [hereinafter Mother's Antiwar Protest]. The county
government also prohibited parking on twenty-three miles of county roads to make staging
protests near the President's ranch more difficult. See id. In response, Sheehan purchased a
five acre parcel of land, using proceeds from her deceased son's military death benefits to
do so. See Associated Press, War Critic Buys Land in Same Town as PresidentBush's Ranch,

N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/28/us/28brfs-004.html
[https://perma.cc/J884-VRQP]. The land was proximate to President Bush's ranch in
Crawford, Texas, and her ownership of it enabled Sheehan to maintain her "Camp Casey"
anti-war protest in honor of her deceased son, Casey Sheehan, who was killed while serving
on active duty in Iraq. See id; see also Associated Press, War Protestor Will Sell Land by

Bush Ranch, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/10/us/
10sheehan.html?fta=y&pagewanted=print [https://perma.cc/X4X8-J7EJ]. Thus, Cindy
Sheehan literally had to acquire property in order to speak her version of truth to power.
Moreover, she did so only after the local government used its ownership rights over public
property-rights of way along county roads--to banish dissent. Mother 's Antiwar Protest,
supra.

3 See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518-21 (1976) (holding that private mall
owners need not permit expressive activities on mall property); Lloyd Corp. v Tanner, 407
U.S. 551, 563-64, 569-70 (1972) (sustaining a mall owner's decision to prohibit leafletting
and picketing at a large shopping mall in Portland, Oregon). But cf PruneYard Shopping
Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 86-87 (1980) (upholding, against a First Amendment
challenge, the California Supreme Court's interpretation of the state constitution to create a
right of access to privately-owned shopping centers for peaceful fixed leafletting activities);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 504-09 (1946) (holding that a private corporation that
undertakes all of the duties and responsibilities of a municipal government constitutes a state
actor and, therefore, must permit and facilitate First Amendment activities within the
company-owned town).
4See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87 (rejecting a mall owner's complaint that private
speech occurring in a large shopping mall inevitably would be attributed to the mall owner
because (1) the protesters' messages "will not likely be identified with those of the owner"
and (2) the mall's owner easily could "expressly disavow any connection with the message
by simply posting signs in the area where the speakers or handbillers stand").
5 See infra note 6 and accompanying text.
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than on others-and will correlate strongly with the popularity or unpopularity
of both speakers and messages. 6
But it was not always thus. 7 To be sure, the broadly protective decisions of
the Warren Court might well have had as much to do with the identity of the
speakers seeking access to public property for speech activity as with the generic
requirements of the First Amendment. 8 Although the Supreme Court
consistently has embraced viewpoint- and content-neutrality as central aspects
9
of the nation's commitment to safeguarding the freedom of speech, it would
require almost willful blindness to ignore the fact that the most broadly
protective free speech decisions of the 1960s invariably involved civil rights
protests in the Deep South.' 0 Nevertheless, as the antiwar protests of the
Vietnam era exploded in the late 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court did not
resile from its general approach-an approach that started with the presumption
that public spaces suitable for expressive activity should be available for such
activity."
Going back to the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Hague v.
Committeefor IndustrialOrganization,decided in 1939, the federal courts have
required government entities to make public property available for speech
activity.1 2 As late as the 1960s, the federal courts generally held that government
3
property should be presumptively available for speech activity.1 Under the
contemporary public forum doctrine, however, the ability of the government to
restrict access to public property for speech activity has increased
6

See HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 140-41, 145

(1965) (discussing the problem of the "heckler veto" and the need for federal courts to be
vigilant in thwarting efforts to empower a heckler's veto over speech by unpopular speakers
on public property); see also Owen M. Fiss, Essay, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71
IOWA L. REv. 1405, 1413-17 (1986) (citing Kalven's seminal work on the problem of a
heckler's veto, discussing the problem of the heckler's veto, observing that private market
power can be used to silence unpopular speakers, and positing that government efforts to
limit the censorial power of non-government actors could enhance rather than inhibit the
vibrancy of the marketplace of ideas).
7
See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 138-43 (1966) (holding that the government
must regulate speech activity "in a reasonable and nondiscriminatory manner, equally
applicable to all and administered with equality to all" and requiring a local government to
make the public library available for a silent civil rights protest).
8
See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana (Cox 1), 379 U.S. 536, 538-39 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana
(Cox II), 379 U.S. 559, 566-67 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 229-30,
237 (1963).
9
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339-41 (2010); United States v. Playboy
Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813-14 (2000); Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 9596 (1972). As Justice Thurgood Marshall explained in Mosley, "[A]bove all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95.
10
See supra note 8.
11
See infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
12
See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 511-12, 524-25 (1939).
13
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969).
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significantly;1 4 simply put, the strong presumption of access to government
property for speech activity no longer exists. 15 Thus, during the Warren and
14See Timothy Zick, Space, Place, andSpeech: The Expressive Topography, 74 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 439, 440, 447 (2006) [hereinafter Zick, Expressive Topography]; Timothy
Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEx. L. REv. 581, 581-83, 585-86 (2006); see also
Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REv. 543, 548-54
(2009) (describing and critiquing various government efforts to suppress if not eliminate
public dissent on government-owned property). Professor Tabatha Abu El-Haj has
documented how governments (at all levels) increasingly marginalize speech in public places
through burdensome regulations and argues that "[a]ll of these requirements undercut the
possibility of large, spontaneous gatherings in the streets." Id at 549.
15See, e.g., Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 1145, 1150, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (rejecting a
First Amendment challenge to a federal statute that bans protest on the large, elevated marble
plaza located in front of the United States Supreme Court because of "the government's longrecognized interests in preserving decorum in the area of a courthouse and in assuring the
appearance (and actuality) of a judiciary uninfluenced by public opinion and pressure").
However, the statute regulated considerably more speech than was necessary to secure this
interest. See 40 U.S.C. § 6135 (2012). Section 6135 bars protest on the plaza regardless of
whether the Supreme Court is actually in session. See Pete Williams, Supreme Court Rebuffs
Challenge
to
Protest
Limits,
NBC
NEWS
(May
16,
2016),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/supreme-court-rebuffs-challenge-protest-limitsn574651 [https://perma.cc/4FGN-ANGY]. It is difficult to see how a protest on the plaza in
mid-August, when the Justices are usually not even on the premises, could possibly
influence, or give the appearance of undue influence, on the Justices. The statute bans
virtually all expressive activity on the plaza, making it illegal to "parade, stand, or move in
processions or assemblages in the Supreme Court Building or grounds, or to display in the
Building and grounds a flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice
a party, organization, or movement." 40 U.S.C. § 6135. The district court found the statute
was overbroad insofar as it covered the plaza, which looks and functions as a public meeting
space and, with respect to the plaza, applies regardless of whether the Supreme Court is
actually in session during a particular protest. See Hodge, 799 F.3d 1150, 1154-55. The D.C.
Circuit made no effort to require the government to tailor § 6135's speech restrictions
narrowly to protect the dignity and integrity of the Supreme Court's oral arguments. See
generally id Judge Srikanth Srinivasan, writing for the majority, described the front plaza
as the private enclave of the Supreme Court, which he characterized as a "nonpublic forum"
that constitutes "the elevated front porch of the Supreme Court building." Id. at 1159. Judge
Srinivasan also dismissed as irrelevant the fact that the Supreme Court Police do not
consistently seek to enforce the speech ban, routinely permitting some speech activity
(including large public protests). See id. at 1161-62. Obviously, the selective enforcement
of a speech ban on public property raises a serious danger of content- and viewpoint-based
discrimination against particular speakers and messages. I do not suggest that the federal
government cannot declare the Supreme Court building itself off-limits to expressive
activity, including noisy protests, but to extend the ban to a broad space generally entirely
open and available to the public, and to characterize it as the Justices' private "front porch,"
reflects a gross disregard for the practical ability of ordinary citizens to participate in the
process of democratic deliberation. Id. at 1159. Cf id at 1160 ("[T]he Supreme Court plaza's
status as a nonpublic forum is unaffected by the public's unrestricted access to the plaza at
virtually any time."). That Judge Srinivasan, a federal appellate judge often mentioned as a
potential Supreme Court nominee for a presumably progressive Democratic president, could
write such a speech-hostile opinion demonstrates quite clearly that contemporary judicial
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Burger Court eras, federal courts more often than not began their First
Amendment analysis in cases involving denials of access to government
property by assuming a general duty on the part of the government to make
public property available for First Amendment activity-provided that the
proposed use was otherwise compatible with the property's more regular uses.1 6
Today, by way of contrast, the burden has shifted to would-be speakers to show
that government property constitutes a traditional public forum or a designated
public forum. This shift in the burden of proof means that Warren Court
decisions involving the use of public property for speech activity would not be
decided in favor of would-be speakers today. 17
Under the Warren Court's approach, a public library could be used for a
silent protest against segregation; it is doubtful that federal courts would reach
the same result under the public forum doctrine. 18 So too, during the Burger
Court era, a military base could be used as a place to protest the Vietnam War. 19
It is highly doubtful that the contemporary Supreme Court would reach the same
result under the public forum doctrine. During the Warren and Burger Court..
eras, the First Amendment analysis generally required the government tojustify
proscribing or restricting speech on its property-rather than requiring a wouldbe speaker to establish that the particular real property at issue constituted either
a traditional or designated public forum. 2 0

-

antipathy toward would-be speakers seeking to use public property for First Amendment
activity is widespread and knows no ideological limits. See Julie Zauzmer, What Would a
Hindu Justice Mean for the Supreme Court?, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2016/03/10/what-would-a-hindujustice-mean-for-the-supreme-court/?utmterm=.a279133bbb4d
[https://perma.cc/4WZGLW93].
16
See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
17
Cf Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 105-09 (M.D. Ala. 1965) (holding that
the First Amendment required Alabama to make a major U.S. highway available for the
Selma-to-Montgomery March, a multi-day protest event, because the location had a direct
link to the legal wrongs being protested and also constituted a proportionate response to these
legal wrongs, and ordering the state to make its property available for the protest march and
rally).
18
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131,138-40 (1966); see Zick, Expressive Topography,
supra note 14, at 497 ("Under current forum analysis, the library, like most contested places,
would most likely be considered a 'non-public' forum. This approach fails to place the
library in local and more general historical perspective.").
1 9 Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197, 198 (1972) (per curiam). Base officials
prohibited John Flower from distributing anti-Vietnam War leaflets at Fort Sam Houston, in
San Antonio, Texas. See United States v. Flower, 452 F.2d 80, 81-82, 89 (5th Cir. 1971),
rev'd, 407 U.S. 197 (1972). The Fifth Circuit held that the government could prohibit speech
activity on the base, see id at 82-86, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Flower
had a First Amendment right to use the base's property to leaflet and promote an antiVietnam War rally. See Flower, 407 U.S. at 198.
20
See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 182-84 (1983); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
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For example, it would be easy to characterize a prison, in categorical terms,
as a kind of First Amendment dead zone. Yet, the Burger Court did not take this
approach. 2 1 Instead of holding that prison officials may ban or restrict speech
activities without being responsible for respecting First Amendment values
because a prison is neither a public forum nor a designated public forum, the
Supreme Court instead held that "a prison inmate retains those First Amendment
rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate
penological objectives of the corrections system." 22
Under this approach, "challenges to prison restrictions that are asserted to
inhibit First Amendment interests must be analyzed in terms of the legitimate
policies and goals of the corrections system." 23 To be sure, the majority in Pell
rejected the specific claim at bar-the right of a prisoner to participate in an inperson, face-to-face interview with a journalist. 2 4 Nevertheless, the locus of the
expressive conduct-a prison--did not entirely foreclose the First Amendment
claim from being considered on the merits and the government had to shoulder
a significant burden of justification to prohibit otherwise protected First
Amendment activity. 2 5
Today, however, the baseline has shifted-and shifted rather dramatically.
Would-be speakers are largely limited to using property of the government's
own choosing for their speech activity-and must do so at a time when the
government deems it convenient to make the property available for speech
activity. 26 If the government designates particular public property a nonpublic
forum, any speech regulations that can be characterized as "reasonable" are

21 See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
22
d.
23

Id

24See id at 827-28. It bears noting that the prison did not bar alternative forms of
communication between inmates and members of the press-such as through written letters
and presumably also telephone calls. Id at 827-29.
25 Id at 822. By way of contrast, the Supreme Court's current approach to substantive
due process and equal protection-based challenges to economic and social legislation reflects
a posture of abject deference to the government, which has no burden of justification
whatsoever. See FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-16 (1993). Instead, a
plaintiff challenging economic or social legislation that does not burden or abridge a
fundamental right must prove a negative-namely that no rational legislator could find that
the law in question bears a rational relationship to any legitimate state interest. See id at 313
("In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along
suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal
protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide
a rational basis for the classification."). Pell's approach simply does not reflect a similar
level of deference to prison officials with respect to the First Amendment rights of prisoners.
See Pell, 417 U.S. at 826-28.
26
See Abu El-Haj, supra note 14, at 548-54, 586-88. Professor Abu El-Haj posits that
"there is good reason to think that current regulatory choices are undermining the
meaningfulness of public assemblies for participants as well as their effectiveness as a
mechanism to influence and check government." Id at 587.
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perfectly constitutional. 27 Government may also create spaces that are reserved
either for particular speakers or particular messages (or both). Limited-purpose
public forums, such as a theater dedicated to presenting theatrical performances
suitable for children, may exclude categorically proposed speech that falls
outside the designated users or purposes. 28 A forum created for a particular
group of speakers, for example current students at a state-operated college or
university, may be categorically closed to local townsfolk.2 9 Thus, the
government as property owner often enjoys a freedom of action that mirrors that
of a private land owner.
It is easy enough to say, "But if it is the government's property, why
shouldn't the government be permitted to decide by whom it may be used and
for what purposes it may be used?" The answer to this question is both simple
and straightforward: government as a property owner should not be able to
leverage its ownership of property to burden or prevent the expression of
dissenting voices. 30 First Amendment doctrine should reflect a fundamental
social commitment to facilitating the process of democratic self-government in
order to ensure that "everything worth saying shall be said." 3 1 If, as Professor
Alexander Meiklejohn posited, "[t]he principle of the freedom of speech springs
from the necessities of the program of self-government," 32 then courts
committed to enforcing First Amendment values should analyze government
actions through the prism of whether they advance, or impede, the ongoing
process of democratic deliberation. My thesis in this Article is that the approach
used by the Warren and Burger Courts advanced these values, whereas the
27

See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("[Tlhe government
may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech . . .").
28
See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1983).
But cf Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555-61 (1975) (rejecting a city's effort
to limit the kinds of programming that could be presented at a municipally-owned and
operated performing arts space because the use restrictions constituted impermissible prior
restraints).
29
See Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 668-70 (2010) (recognizing that government entities can and do
create limited-purpose public forums and may limit access to such forums to certain speakers
and particular kinds of speech without violating the First Amendment); Lyrissa Lidsky,
Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 1984-86 (2011) (describing and discussing the
concept of a limited-purpose public forum and its application in ChristianLegal Society).
30
See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA 1012, 33-35, 41-48 (1999) (proposing a general interpretative approach to enforcing the First
Amendment that privileges speech of a dissenting cast and arguing that dissent lies "at the
heart of the First Amendment"). Professor Shiffrin explains that "[m]y suggestion will be
that a free speech theory accenting protection for dissent fares better than a theory based in
the protection of political speech or liberty." Id at 33; see id. at 91 ("Free speech theory
should be taken beyond protecting or tolerating dissent: the First Amendment should be
taken to reflect a constitutional commitment to promoting dissent.").
31

ALEXANDER MELKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT

25 (1948).
32

Id. at 26.

788

OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 78:4

approach currently in vogue, and which came to full flower during the Rehnquist
and Roberts Courts, does not. 33
This Article proceeds in three main parts. Part II begins by considering some
iconic decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts. 34 Because the Warren Court
decisions often involved speech associated with the civil rights movement, it
would be reasonable to question whether or not the outcomes reflect a
generalized commitment to making public property available for speech activity
or rather targeted support of a cause that most of the incumbent Justices
subjectively supported. 35 However, later judicial decisions, issued during the
Burger Court era, did not involve civil rights protesters or efforts to end Jim
Crow and racial segregation and, yet, still generally used the same open-ended
balancing approach to resolve disputes about access to government property for
speech activity-with the government having to shoulder the burden of
justifying denials of access to public property for speech activity. 36 Indeed, even
in cases involving locations such as prisons and military bases, the Burger Court
used a balancing approach-rather than a categorical approach--to determine
whether the government has a First Amendment obligation to make its property
available for speech activity. 37
The Article continues, in Part H, by contrasting the more categorical
approach of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, which relies on an initial
characterization of particular government-owned property to prefigure the
extent to which the government must make it available for private speech
activity. 3 8 Moreover, even if this initial analysis leads to the conclusion that
property should generally be available for speech activity, a second level of
analysis considers whether government restrictions on expressive activity using
the property are content and viewpoint neutral and constitute reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions. 39 To state the matter simply, the tables have
turned and the burden has shifted from the government to justify restricting
speech on its property to would-be speakers to prove that they have a legal right
to use the property for speech activity.
33

For a history of the public forum doctrine's theoretical and doctrinal origins and
development into the early years of the Rehnquist Court, see generally Robert C. Post,
Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34

UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987).
34
See infra notes 58-82 and accompanying text.
35
See infra notes 58-73 and accompanying text.
36
See infra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
37
See infra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
38
See infra Part Ill.
39 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("Our cases make clear,
however, that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on
the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions 'arejustified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information."' (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984))).
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Part IV considers how First Amendment values could be better secured and
advanced if the federal courts were to move the analytical baseline back toward
the more speech-friendly approach of the Warren and Burger Courts. 40 Simply
put, the government should always have to shoulder the burden of justifying
why public property cannot be made available for private speech activity. I do
not suggest that no categorical rules should exist-some government spaces, for
example, a judge's chambers, should be subject to categorical exclusions from
use for expressive activities. However, the governing doctrinal framework
should presume a generalized duty on the government's part to facilitate, rather
than impede, activities protected under the First Amendment. More specifically,
federal courts should not use a historical approach to determine whether a
particular kind of government property should be available for private speech
activity but instead should revert back to the functional approach that the
Warren and Burger Courts routinely deployed. 4 1
Finally, Part V offers a brief summary and overview of the arguments set
forth in this Article. 4 2 The First Amendment decisions of the Warren and Burger
Courts imposed affirmative obligations on the government to facilitate speech
activity by providing access to government-owned property-even when
government officials would have preferred to deny the would-be protesters
access. Today, however, the government enjoys broad discretion to ban protests
from public property-even from property like national parks and public
memorials that would otherwise seem to constitute traditional public forums. 4 3
Moreover, even in a traditional public forum, the contemporary federal courts
routinely have sustained content neutral, reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions that significantly restrict the availability of public property for
speech activity.44
40

See infra Part IV.
41 Cf Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683 (1992)
(holding that an airport concourse does not constitute a public forum and, accordingly, that
the government may impose reasonable speech regulations that restrict or prohibit speech
activity within the concourse area-even though it otherwise functions in many respects as
a de facto government-owned and operated shopping mall).
42
See infra Part V.
43
See, e.g., Oberwetter v. Hilliard, 639 F.3d 545, 552-54 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding
a ban on protest activity at the Jefferson Memorial). For a relevant discussion, see Zick,
Expressive Topography, supra note 14, at 487-505 (discussing the relevance of particular
spaces and access to specific potential audiences to expressive activity and arguing that even
though spaces are not inherently fungible, current First Amendment time, place, and manner
jurisprudence presumes one space is just as good as another for expressive activity).
Professor Zick argues that "[clourts should again be thinking in terms of the new expressive
topography when assessing spatial adequacy. Places are unique." Id at 504. It necessarily
follows that "denying access to contested places is a substantial restraint on messages
targeting those places." Id.
4See, e.g., United States v. Kistner, 68 F.3d 218, 222 (8th Cir. 1995) (upholding
National Park Service TPM regulations that severely limited protest activity within the St.
Louis Arch park).
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If we truly believe that a well-functioning democratic polity requires a
vibrant ongoing dialogue among citizens about government and its officers, 4 5
including a strong, if not unyielding, commitment to protecting the freedom of
political speech, 46 then the federal courts must require the government to make
more public spaces available for public protest and to do so more reliably.
Simply put, ownership of property should not be a de facto precondition of
participating in the process of democratic deliberation.
II. FACILITATING DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION BY PROVIDING WOULDBE SPEAKERS WITH ACCESS TO PUBLIC PROPERTY FOR EXPRESSIVE
ACTIVITIES: A POSITIVE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
GOVERNMENT PROPERTY UNDER THE WARREN AND BURGER COURTS

The Supreme Court, in the nineteenth century, took the view that
government, as the owner of a property interest, could regulate the use of its
property more-or-less exactly as a private property owner could manage its
property. 47 Consistent with this logic, if the government possesses the power to
close property that it owns entirely to speech activity, then it should hold a
concomitant power to decide what kinds of expressive activity it will tolerate on
its property. As then-Justice, and later Chief Justice, Edward D. White explained
in Davis, "The right to absolutely exclude all right to use, necessarily includes
the authority to determine under what circumstances such use may be availed
of, as the greater power contains the lesser." 4 8 This perspective reflects the view
that government, as the owner of real property, has the constitutional power to
decide what uses it will permit on what is, after all, the government's property. 49
Over time, however, the Supreme Court came to reject the analogy of the
government to a private property owner and began to require the government to
make public spaces available for First Amendment activities. Thus, in Hague v.
Committee for Industrial Organization, the Justices squarely rejected a claim
more-or-less identical to the government's claim in Davis and, if not expressly
45

See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964).
See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458-61 (2011); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52-56 (1988). For a general discussion of how and why contemporary
First Amendment law disallows the regulation of offensive or outrageous speech, either
directly or through the imposition of civil liability by juries, see Robert C. Post, The
46

ConstitutionalConcept ofPublic Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation,

and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REv. 601, 624-32 (1990).
47
See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47-48 (1897).
4
8 Id. at 48.
49This view has resurfaced from time to time in majority opinions. See, e.g., Lyng v.
Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988) ("The Constitution does
not permit government to discriminate against religions that treat particular physical sites as
sacred, and a law prohibiting the Indian respondents from visiting the Chimney Rock area
would raise a different set of constitutional questions. Whatever rights the Indians may have
to the use of the area, however, those rights do not divest the Government of its right to use
what is, after all, its land.").
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overruling it, signaled that Davis's approach no longer commanded a majority
of the Court.50
Writing for a plurality, but with a majority supporting this portion of his
opinion, Justice Owen Roberts explained that the First Amendment limits the
government's authority to regulate its real property in ways that impede
expressive activities protected by the First Amendment. He explained that:
We have no occasion to determine whether, on the facts disclosed, the Davis
case was rightly decided, but we cannot agree that it rules the instant case.
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of
citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and
parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in
the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in
subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with
peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged
or denied. 51
In other words, the government, in its capacity as a property owner, must make
real property available for expressive activities-even if it would prefer not to
do so. This approach clearly gives the First Amendment a significant
affirmative, or positive aspect; the Free Speech and Assembly Clauses do not
merely prevent the government from acting to prohibit speech and assembly,
but also require the government to lend its affirmative assistance to such
activities.
Thus, unlike other provisions of the Bill of Rights-indeed, even other
provisions of the First Amendment itself, such as the Press Clause-the Free
Speech and Assembly Clauses empower citizens to make positive demands of
assistance, in the form of access to government-owned property, for speech
activity. Although Justice Roberts does not directly link this obligation to
provide affirmative support to expressive activities to the project of democratic
self-government, his language plainly acknowledges the relationship between
speech and assembly, on the one hand, and democratic self-government, on the
other. 52 After all "views on national questions" and discussion of "public
questions" plainly relate to the process of democratic deliberation that is
necessary to sustain democratic self-government. 53 Under the animating theory
of Hague, the government must afford the general public access to public spaces
for the purpose of exercising their First Amendment rights. 54
50
51

See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16, 524-25 (1939).

_d at 515-16.
521d
53 _d
541d.
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Subsequent cases make clear that the right to use public property for
expressive activities is not without boundaries. To redeploy a phrase first used
in the Supreme Court's seminal regulatory takings precedent, "[g]ovemment
hardly could go on" 55 if any and every citizen could demand, at will, access to
public property for the purpose of engaging in speech activity. Hague cannot
mean that the imperatives of the government as a manager can never take
precedence over the interests of would-be speakers who seek access to public
property for speech activity. However, the question is where the burden in such
cases should fall. Should it rest with the government to show that particular
property cannot be used for speech activity without impeding the legitimate
managerial imperatives of the government? 56 Or rather, on a would-be speaker
to show that the government has traditionally permitted particular property to
be used for First Amendment activities?
Throughout the civil rights movement, the Supreme Court generally
vindicated the use of government property for speech activity-even if the
property did not constitute what contemporary jurisprudence would call a
"traditional public forum." 57 For example, a public library is not self-evidently
a place that, since time immemorial, has been available for protest activity. Yet,
the Supreme Court rejected a claim that a local government could seek to
enforce a trespass claim against civil rights protesters who held a protest in a
racially segregated, local public library.5 8 So too, South Carolina had a duty to
make available the grounds surrounding the state capitol building, even though
these grounds were not routinely used for mass protests. 59 The Supreme Court
also invalidated criminal convictions against civil rights protesters who marched
from Louisiana's old state capitol building to the local parish (county)
courthouse to protest the arrest of student activists who had sought to
desegregate local lunch counters in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 60
Cox v. Louisiana is highly instructive because the majority opinion,
authored by Justice Arthur Goldberg, considers the ability of the government to
ensure the smooth functioning of the public courts of law, but concludes that, as
applied, a law aimed at protecting courts from the influence of fixed pickets
violated the First Amendment. 6 1 The protesters' facial challenge to the
55

Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); see Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State
Bd. of Equalization of Colo., 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) ("There must be a limit to individual
argument in such matters if government is to go on.").
56

ROBERT

C.

POST,

CONSTITUTIONAL

DOMAINS:

DEMOCRACY,

COMMUNITY,

MANAGEMENT 4-10, 13-16, 237-47, 261-62 (1995).
57
See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990) (holding that "[t]he mere
physical characteristics of the property cannot dictate forum analysis" and explaining that
"regulation of speech activity where the Government has not dedicated its property to First
Amendment activity is examined only for reasonableness").
58
See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966).
59
See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235-37 (1963).
60
Cox v. Louisiana (Cox 1), 379 U.S. 536, 538-44, 552, 558 (1965); Cox. v. Louisiana
(Cox lI), 379 U.S. 559, 573 (1965).
61 Cox Hl, 379 U.S. at 573.
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Louisiana law failed because the state possessed a strong interest in preventing
political pressures from being brought to bear on the administrative ofjustice.
Justice Goldberg explained that:
There can be no question that a State has a legitimate interest in protecting its
judicial system from the pressures which picketing near a courthouse might
create. Since we are committed to a government of laws and not of men, it is
of the utmost importance that the administration of justice be absolutely fair
and orderly. This Court has recognized that the unhindered and untrammeled
functioning of our courts is part of the very foundation of our constitutional
62
democracy.

Accordingly, the state could, consistent with the First Amendment, enact a
general proscription against fixed pickets at courthouses, so long as the
measures adopted are "necessary and appropriate to assure that the
administration ofjustice at all stages is free from outside control and influence,"
and provided that the statute is "narrowly drawn" to achieve these objectives. 63
Justice Goldberg's analysis, however, involves an open-ended balancing of
the government's interest in safeguarding the impartial administration ofjustice
and the interest of would-be protesters in maintaining a fixed picket near a
courthouse.M In considering an "as applied" challenge to the application of the
statute on the facts at bar, Justice Goldberg rejected the argument that any and
every protest proximate to a courthouse will be prejudicial to the fair and orderly
administration ofjustice. 65 He also carefully considered precisely how and when
the protest took place: "It is undisputed that the demonstration took place on the
west sidewalk, the far side of the street, exactly 101 feet from the courthouse
steps and, judging from the pictures in the record, approximately 125 feet from
the courthouse itself." 66 Thus, the demonstration was merely "near" and not "in"
the courthouse. 67 Government officials also had specifically authorized a protest
directly across the street from the courthouse grounds. 68 These factors,
considered together and in context, required reversal of the convictions on an
as-applied basis. 69
Justice Hugo L. Black, by way of contrast, agreed that the breach of peace
convictions were invalid, but dissented from the majority's conclusion that the
as-applied challenge to Louisiana's ban on protests near courthouses possessed
merit. 70 He noted that the statute in question, § 14:401, made it unlawful for any
person to stage a demonstration proximate to a courthouse with the intent of
62

1d at 562.
63Id
6Id at 565-68.
id at 567.
1d. at 568.
67
Cox II, 379 U.S. at 568.
68
1d at 569-70.
69
1d at 574-75.
70
1d at 580-83 (Black, J. dissenting).
65
See
66
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influencing judges and other court officials regarding a pending judicial
matter.7 1 Justice Black emphasized that this statute prohibited "anyone, under
any conditions, [from] picket[ing] or parad[ing] near a courthouse, residence or
other building used by a judge, juror, witness, or court officer, 'with the intent
of influencing' any of them." 72 He emphasized that the law sought to protect the
judicial process itself "from the intimidation and dangers that inhere in huge
gatherings at courthouse doors and jail doors to protest arrests and to influence
court officials in performing their duties." 73
Thus, Justice Black argued for a more categorical approach to making
government property available for protest activity-and, in Black's view, a
courthouse, and environs surrounding it, could be constitutionally declared "off
limits" for speech activity. 74 Justice Black would have upheld this regulation
even though the protest at issue took place near a local courthouse but outside
regular business hours, and, therefore, did not pose much of a threat of undue
influence. 75 And, even though other forms of expressive conduct, such as
buying television ads, radio spots, or outdoor billboards attacking a particular
judge or urging a particular result in a pending case, could present no-less-direct
a threat to the integrity of the judicial process, they would have fallen outside
the letter of the Louisiana statute. 76 The Louisiana law was plainly both over
inclusive (because it prohibited protests when judicial personnel were absent)
and under inclusive (because it did not regulate other speech activity that might
unduly influence judges or court personnel regarding pendingjudicial business).
The majority's approach, unlike Justice Black's approach, uses an openended balancing test to resolve the relative equities on the facts presented.
Because local government officials had approved a location for the protest
almost identical to the location actually used, the government's claim that it had
a pressing need to banish the protest from the area near the courthouse rang
entirely hollow. 77 After all, if one side of the street was appropriate for a mass
meeting and protest featuring 2,000 participants, then so too was the other.
Justice Goldberg's approach obviously suffers from the risk of subjective
application of the balancing test-if a judge were hostile to the message
protesters sought to propagate, she could put her thumb on the scale when
assessing the risk the protest presented.
This is, to be sure, a nontrivial shortcoming of an open-ended balancing test
to determine the suitability of public property for First Amendment activities. 78
71 Id at 581-82; LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:401 (2004).
72
Cox II, 379 U.S. at 581-82 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:401).
73
Id at 583.
74

See id

75
See
76

id at 584.
See LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:401.
77
Cox 11, 379 U.S. at 569-72.
78

See RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE: SEDITIOUS
LIBEL, "OFFENSIVE" PROTEST, AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR A
REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES 204-05 (2012).
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A less categorical approach to determining whether public property should be
available for would-be protesters presents a risk of enabling stealth content- or
viewpoint-based discrimination by federal judges. 79 This problem of judicial
discretion is no greater, however, than in other contexts, such as how to
categorize speech for purposes of applying the First Amendment.
For example, the categorization of speech as "political," "commercial," or
"obscene" often prefigures its protected or unprotected status under the First
Amendment. 80 Applying categorical labels to particular examples of speech
activity involves no less judicial discretion than would the task of assessing
whether proposed speech activity is consistent, or inconsistent, with the more
regular uses of the particular public property at issue.8 1 A balancing approach
that weighs the interests of would-be speakers against the interests of the
government in reserving property for its more regular uses means that any and
all government property could, at least in theory, be available to support
expressive activities. 82
To be sure, the government's interest in reserving some public property
exclusively for the government's use will be impossible to overcome-for
example, a judge's chambers or a district attorney's office. Even so, however, a
balancing exercise could work. As I have argued previously, "[a]lthough this
exercise creates the possibility of unfairness in individual cases," the potential
benefits of this approach, "more than offset this opportunity cost." 83 In sum, the
distinct virtue of Justice Goldberg's approach is that it forces the government to
make a convincing case that it has a good reason for denying access to the
property that the protesters seek to use; the burden rests on the state to justify a
denial of access, rather than on would-be protesters to establish an affirmative
and general right to use the public property for speech activity.
Other properties will obviously be off limits during some periods of timefor example, the government's interest in using a high school building for
educational activities would outweigh the interest of would-be protesters in
using the building for a political rally during periods when classes are actually
in session. But what about periods, such as the summer break, when the high
school is not being used for classes and sits more or less empty and unused? Or
periods of the day during the school year when the high school is not being used
for instructional activities, such as in the evenings or during the weekend?
79

80

[d

1d

81See id. at 202-05.
82
See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 859-60 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that "the notion of 'public forum' has never been the touchstone of public expression, for a
contrary approach blinds the Court to any possible accommodation of First Amendment
values in this case" and positing that "[t]hose cases permitting public expression without
characterizing the locale involved as a public forum, together with those cases recognizing
the existence of a public forum, albeit qualifiedly, evidence the desirability of a flexible
approach
to determining when public expression should be protected").
83
KROTOSZYNSK, supra note 78, at 205.
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Should a local school board be able to say "our high school auditorium is a nonpublic forum" and deny access to anyone seeking to use it for First Amendment
activities? Even if it constitutes the only facility of its kind in a remote, rural
community? And, even if the school board permits its use for noneducational
functions, such as serving as an official polling place for primary and general
elections?
Lest a skeptical reader think that the Warren and Burger Courts deployed
this balancing approach solely for the benefit of civil rights groups whose goals
and objectives enjoyed the personal support of the Justices comprising the
majority, the practice of using an open-ended balancing test to determine
whether the government could deny access to its property continued well into
the 1970s and was applied in cases having little or nothing to do with civil rights
protesters. 84 Moreover, the Supreme Court used this approach in cases seeking
court-mandated access to publicly-owned venues for speech activities that were
even less plausible than a sidewalk adjacent to a county courthouse. 8 5
III. THE PUBLIC FORUM AND TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER DOCTRINES
VEST GOVERNMENT WITH BROAD DISCRETION TO LIMIT OR PROHIBIT
SPEECH ACTIVITY ON PUBLIC PROPERTY
In the 1970s, even as a majority of the Burger Court continued to use an
open-ended balancing test to determine whether government property should be
available for First Amendment activities, then-Associate Justice William
Rehnquist argued, initially in dissent, but eventually in majority opinions, that
a more categorical approach was needed to vindicate the government's
legitimate managerial interests.

86

By the 1980s, and his promotion to the Chief

Justice's office, these views regularly came to command a majority of the
Justices.87 Instead of squarely placing a burden of justification on the
government when it denied access to public property for speech activity, the
Supreme Court instead required would-be speakers to establish that the property
84

See supra notes 19-25; see infra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.

85 See infra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
86
For an excellent discussion of how the government's role as a manager could justify
at least some speech restrictions in government workplaces and on government property, see
generally Robert C. Post, Essay, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151 (1996).
87
See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725-28 (1990). Two decisions in
the late Burger Court period embrace the public forum doctrine. See Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) ("[T]he Court has adopted a forum
analysis as a means of determining when the Government's interest in limiting the use of its
property to its intended purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the property
for other purposes."); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46
(1983) ("Public property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public
communication is governed by different standards. We have recognized that the 'First
Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled
by the government."' (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453
U.S. 114, 129 (1981))).
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that they wished to use constituted either a public forum or a designated public
forum.8 8

By the 1990s, spaces that clearly could be used for expressive activities,
such as airport concourses, were judicially declared to be off limits, nonpublic
forums, and closed to speech activity. 8 9 In addition to an increasingly restrictive
definition of public forums, the Supreme Court also adopted a test for analyzing
restrictions on the use of public forums that allowed very broad restrictions on
speech activity within traditional and designated public forums. 90 The combined
screening effects of a very limited universe of highly regulated public forums
and designated public forums significantly restricted the public property
potentially available to host First Amendment activities.
In fairness, a turn toward a more categorical approach to determining
whether the First Amendment requires the government to make public property
available for speech activity first appeared during the Burger Court's later
years91 and continued to gain jurisprudential traction into the 1980s. 92 By the
early 1980s, the public forum doctrine was sufficiently well-established that
Justice Byron White, in Perry, was able to read existing precedents as creating
three, and possibly four, typologies of government property. 9 3 Nevertheless, the
public forum doctrine did not reach full flower until the Rehnquist Court.94
Although some legal scholars point to decisions such as Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad95 and Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights96 as
constituting the Supreme Court's initial embrace of the public forum doctrine,
these decisions, in point of fact, did not establish the rigid public forum doctrine

88
89

Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679-83

(1992).
90

See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
91 PerryEduc. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45-48.
92
See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800-06.
93
PerryEduc. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45-46, 46 n.7.
94
See infra notes 100-31 and accompanying text.
95
Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
96
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
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enforced by the federal courts today. 97 Later decisions, such as Greerv. Spock,9 8
reverted to the more open-ended balancing test used in cases like Brown v.
Louisiana.99 Until the 1980s, the suggestion that the government could
categorically exclude speech from its property unless the property constituted a
traditional public forum or a designated public forum appeared exclusively in
dissentingopinions.'

97

See, e.g., Post, supra note 33, at 1733-39. Professor Post points to Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828 (1976), as "[tihe pivotal decision" in the development of the public forum
doctrine. See Post, supra note 33, at 1739. Viewed from the vantage point of doctrinal
developments in 1987, this proposition seems quite reasonable-after all, Greerwas the first
case to invoke the metaphor of a "public forum" in a majority opinion. Greer, 424 U.S. at
838. Nevertheless, as I explain in some detail below, Greer actually used a balancing, rather
than a categorical, approach to determining whether the government had an obligation to
make particular property available for speech activity. See infra note 98. It is certainly fair
to posit that Greer constitutes the first majority Supreme Court opinion that adopted the
nomenclature of the "public forum," but Greer's application of the doctrine, in hindsight,
was considerably more demanding of the government than later applications of the more
fully developed public forum doctrine. See infra notes 122 and 139 and accompanying text.
98
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). To be sure, Justice Potter Stewart's majority
opinion in Greer makes a passing reference to the concept of certain government property
constituting a public forum. Id. at 836 ("The Court of Appeals was mistaken, therefore, in
thinking that the Flower case is to be understood as announcing a new principle of
constitutional law, and mistaken specifically in thinking that Flower stands for the principle
that whenever members of the public are permitted freely to visit a place owned or operated
by the Government, then that place becomes a 'public forum' for purposes of the First
Amendment. Such a principle of constitutional law has never existed, and does not exist
now."). Despite on offhand reference to government property as a public forum, Justice
Stewart's opinion carefully weighs the government's asserted interests for prohibiting a
partisan political rally from a suburban New Jersey army base-it does not simply declare
the base to be a nonpublic forum and sustain the government's speech restrictions. See id at
837-40. Thus, although Greer does feature the phrase "public forum," the case itself does
not actually adopt a rigid, categorical approach to analyzing whether the government has an
obligation to make property available for speech activity. But see Post, supra note 33, at
1739-43 (arguing that Greer laid the theoretical and doctrinal foundation for the
development of the public forum doctrine). Professor Post suggests that "Greer's
resurrection of the major premise of the Davis syllogism was decisive for the future
development of public forum doctrine, although the Court made no effort constitutionally to
explain or justify its use of the premise." Id at 1743. This is undoubtedly true-Greerdoes
not proceed from a strong presumption that government property otherwise suitable for
proposed speech activity must be made available to the would-be speakers. Even so,
however, Greer demands far more by way of government justification than later cases, such
as Cornelius, which requires nothing more than that speech regulations in nonpublic forums
be "reasonable." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797,
800-01, 806-07 (1985).
99 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-43 (1966).
10OSee, e.g., Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197, 199-200 (1972) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Cox v. Louisiana (Cox II), 379 U.S. 559, 583 (1965) (Black, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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Justice Hugo Black pioneered the argument that the government could
exclude speech from public property if the property did not constitute a
traditional public forum. He made this argument in very strong terms in Cox H,
but in dissent. Black argued in Cox II that a categorical proscription against
protest activity proximate to courthouses did not offend the First Amendment:
"Justice cannot be rightly administered, nor are the lives and safety of prisoners
secure, where throngs of people clamor against the processes of justice right
outside the courthouse orjailhouse doors." 101
Similarly, Justice William Rehnquist advocated a categorical approach to
evaluating denials of access to government property in cases presenting
government efforts to prohibit speech activity on public property. Justice
Rehnquist began to sketch his vision of the public forum doctrine in his
dissenting opinion in Flower, a case that invalidated a ban against leafletting on
a portion of a military base in San Antonio, Texas, that was generally open to
the public.' 02
Then-Justice, and later Chief Justice, Rehnquist argued that:
[C]ivilian authorities may draw reasonable distinctions, based on the purpose
for which public buildings and grounds are used, in according the right to
exercise First Amendment freedoms in such buildings and on such grounds.
Simply because some activities and individuals are allowed on government
property does not require the abandonment of otherwise allowable restrictions
on its use. 103

Harking back to the reasoning of Davis, the government as a property owner
may select the kinds and scope of expressive activity that it will permit on its
property. 104

Two years later, Justice Rehnquist renewed his effort to reduce the
imposition of involuntary First Amendment easements on government-owned
property. His dissenting opinion in Southeastern Promotions makes a largely
identical argument to his Flower dissent, namely, that "if it is the desire of the
citizens of Chattanooga, who presumably have paid for and own the facilities,
that the attractions to be shown there should not be of the kind which would
offend any substantial number of potential theatergoers," then the city should be
able to refuse to rent the venue for the purpose of mounting a racy, adultoriented traveling production of the musical Hair.0 5 In other words, if the
government creates a forum for expressive activity, then the government may
decide both who may use the forum and the expressive purposes for which it
may be used.

101
Cox II, 379 U.S. at 583 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
102
Flower, 407 U.S. at 199-200 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

103Id. at 200.

104
See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897).
10 5
Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 572 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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It was not until 1983, and Justice Byron White's opinion for a five-to-four
majority in Perry, that the public forum doctrine enjoyed a full explication and
the clear support of a majority.1 06 Justice White's Perry opinion organizes
earlier cases into categories and posits the existence of three, or perhaps four,
distinct classes of public property: (1) traditional public forums, (2) designated
public forums, (3) and nonpublic forums.' 0 7 Justice White hints at a fourth
category-a limited-purpose public forum-and subsequent cases have made
clear that this constitutes a distinct subcategory comprised of forums, whether
physical or intangible, that the government creates and designates for the
exclusive use of particular speakers, content, or both.' 0 8 In Perry, however,
Justice White lumps limited-purpose public forums in with designated public
forums;1 09 subsequent cases, however, have distinguished them and given the
government broad authority to subsidize particular speakers or speech.110
The specific forum at issue in Perry, an internal mail system created and
maintained by a public school district,I' was not generally open to the public
and, although not reserved exclusively for internal school district
communications, was used primarily for official communications between the
school district's administration and the district's employees.11 2 Even under the
more open-ended balancing test of Brown v. Louisiana,"l3 it is doubtful that the
First Amendment would have supported a generalized right of access by the
public to the school district's internal mail system. Indeed, even the dissenting
Justices in Perry did not posit a universal right of public access, but instead
argued that an association of teachers seeking to challenge the incumbent
collective bargaining representative should be granted equal access to the
internal mail system as the incumbent teachers' union already enjoyed.114
Thus, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.'s dissent did not posit that the internal
mail system should be generically available to any and all comers, but instead
characterized the exclusion of a rival employees' union as a form of viewpoint
discrimination in a forum that had been made available for speech of the sort
that the rival union wished to propagate." 5 Justice Brennan's dissent also used
a functional analysis that assessed the compatibility of the proposed speech with
the particular government-created forum and found that the proposed speech

1 06 See generally Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 3755 (1983).
1 0 7 Id. at 45-46.
108 See id at 46 n.7; see also Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter ofthe Univ. of Cal., Hastings
Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679-83 (2010).
1 09 Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7.
110 See, e.g., ChristianLegal Soc 'y, 561 U.S. at 679 n.11.
111
Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 39-40.
112 See id at 47-48.
113 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-43 (1966).
114See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 60-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
115 Id. at61-62.
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came within the subject matter of the forum and would not unduly burden its
use for its more regular purposes.116
Perry represented a near-complete victory for the Black/Rehnquist
categorical approach to assessing whether particular public property should, in
general, be available to the public for the exercise of First Amendment rights.
Subsequent cases, decided under the Rehnquist Court, quickly consolidated this
doctrinal innovation and ossified it. The Supreme Court narrowly defined the
concept of a public forum and used a very strict, tradition- and history-based
approach to exclude new kinds of forums-such as charitable fundraising drives
among government workers,11 7 a sidewalk and parking lot at a post office,11 8
and airports. 119 Taking quite literally Hague's language about places that had,
since time immemorial, been available for use for expressive activities, 120 the
conservative majority recognized very broad government discretion to prohibit
speech activities on publically-owned property. 12 1
In short, the Supreme Court increasingly granted the government broad
authority to determine for itself whether or not its property would be generally
available for speech activity. It did so, as Chief Justice Rehnquist explained,
because "[w]here the government is acting as a proprietor, managing its internal
operations, rather than acting as lawmaker with the power to regulate or license,
its action will not be subjected to the heightened review to which its actions as
a lawmaker may be subject." 1 22 In other words, managerial imperatives justify
limiting or even proscribing the use of government property for speech activity.
Under this approach, the government does not operate under any general duty
to create free speech easements on its property unless it chooses to do so
voluntarily (by creating a designated public forum)1 2 3 or the property at issue
constitutes a traditional public forum using a history-based test (which
categorically excludes new types of government property from ever becoming
a traditional public forum).1 24
Concurrently, with respect to a public forum, the Rehnquist Court adopted
a policy of sustaining against First Amendment challenges content- and
1 16 See id at 63-66.
17 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
118 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 729-30 (1990).
l 9 See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679-81 (1992).

12 0

See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).

121 See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 725-26.
1 2 2 Int'l Soc'y, 505 U.S. at 678.
1 23 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 805 (1985)
("The Government did not create the CFC [Combined Federal Campaign] for purposes of
providing a forum for expressive activity. That such activity occurs in the context of the
forum created does not imply that the forum thereby becomes a public forum for First
Amendment purposes.").
124
See Int'l Soc'y, 505 U.S. at 680 ("[T]he tradition of airport activity does not
demonstrate that airports have historically been made available for speech activity. Nor can
we say that these particular terminals, or airport terminals generally, have been intentionally
opened by their operators to such activity .... ).
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viewpoint-neutral reasonable time, place, and manner (TPM) regulations.1 25
Thus, even if a would-be speaker was able to prevail on the preliminary question
of whether particular government property should be available for speech
activity, clearing this initial hurdle was merely a necessary, and not sufficient,
condition for obtaining access to government property for protest activity.1 26
The government retained broad discretion to regulate the terms and conditions
under which a traditional public forum (or designated public forum) could be
used for speech activity.1 27
Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority in Ward, explained that
[Elven in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions
on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions "are
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
28
information."l

The Ward test sounds considerably more demanding in theory than it proves to
be in practice. 129
First, the federal courts do not look very deeply into the government's actual
motives for enacting TPM regulations;1 3 0 thus, the adoption of limits on protest
activity near abortion clinics after Operation Rescue comes to town does not
make TPM regulations content-based.131 Second, the federal courts are not
terribly demanding regarding either the government's purpose or the fit between
the means used to achieve the government's substantial goal and actual

125

See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790-91 (1989).

126 Id

1 27 See id at 791 ("A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of
expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages
but not others.").
128 Id.
129
See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 78, at 27-31 (discussing the insufficiency of the
standards governing time, place, and manner restrictions).
1 30 See id at 28-31.
131 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719-20, 725-30 (2000). The Hill majority bizarrely
claimed that a speech ban near abortion clinics was "not a 'regulation of speech"' but instead
"a regulation of the places where some speech may occur." Id. at 719. Similarly, in Turner
BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. FCC, the Supreme Court ignored a clear congressional purpose
to help propagate particular kinds of programming-namely local programming, educational
programming, and news and public affairs programming-over other kinds of content and
used local television stations as a de facto proxy for entities that will create and distribute
programming of the sort that Congress favored. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622, 644-48 (1994). But cf id at 677-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that the preference for locally-based, educational, and news and
public affairs programming constituted a government preference for this kind of content and
rendered the must carry provisions of the Cable Act content-based regulations of speech).
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attainment of the goal itself.132 Third, and finally, the "ample alternative
channels for communication" requirement may be satisfied if one could upload
a blog post to the internet or hand out leaflets somewhere else. 133 As I have
observed previously, "[p]rovided that government is willing to restrict all
speakers alike, the time, place, and manner doctrine, as explicated in Ward and
subsequent cases, imposes relatively few absolute limits on such
regulations."l 34

IV.

TOWARD A RENEWED COMMITMENT TO MAKING PUBLIC SPACE
RELIABLY AVAILABLE FOR SPEECH ACTIVITY

The Supreme Court's motive in adopting a categorical approach to define
and structure the public's right to use government-owned property for speech
activity is easy to understand: The public forum doctrine provides bright-line
rules that are easy to state and relatively easy to apply. Accordingly, lower
federal and state courts will usually reach the same results regarding the nature
of a particular forum-whether traditional, designated, limited-purpose, or
nonpublic. The TPM doctrine also provides an easy to state, and relatively easy
to apply, framework for determining whether government imposed limits on
public, designated, and limited-purpose public forums trench too deeply on the
exercise of expressive freedoms. Both the categorization exercise and the TPM
doctrine vest the government with substantial managerial discretion to reserve
public property for the specific purposes that led the government to acquire the
property in the first place. Given the challenges the government faces in running
vast bureaucracies, the random use of government property by private citizens
for speech activity could easily lead to chaos and disruption.1 3 5
In sum, the public forum and TPM doctrines both protect the government's
ability to operate its myriad programs on a day-to-day basis. The federal courts
also have disallowed government efforts to parcel out access to public property
for speech activity based on the viewpoint or content of the proposed speech
activity.1 36 Government officials also must apply TPM regulations with an even
hand and such regulations must advance an important government interest and
leave open ample alternative channels of communication.1 37 It would be wildly
wide of the mark to suggest that the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have returned
13 2

See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 78, at 27-28.
See id. at 27-39.
134Id at 31.
13 5
See POST, supra note 56, at 237-47 (discussing the dangers of First Amendment
jurisprudence undermining the government's ability to attain legitimate, managerial goals).
136
Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133-36 (1992). Writing for the
Forsyth County majority, Justice Harry Blackmun observed that "[t]his Court has held time
and again: 'Regulations which permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of the
content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment."' Id at 135 (quoting
Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984)).
137 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
133
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the First Amendment baseline to Davis v. Massachusetts.138 Under the existing
doctrinal rules, the government clearly may not restrict speech on public
property with as free a hand as a private citizen or corporation may restrict
speech on privately-owned property.
Nevertheless, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have reset the balance in
the government's favor and have done so to a significant degree. Access to
government property for expressive activities is considerably more
circumscribed today than it was in the 1960s or 1970s. 13 9 Persons seeking access
to government property for speech activity now have to meet an initial burden
of convincing a court that the specific property they seek to use constitutes a
traditional or designated public forum-or that it is a limited-purpose public
forum and the proposed speakers or speech activities fall within the class of
speakers or speech authorized to use the forum. 140 Even if a plaintiff meets this
initial burden, the government will still prevail if the denial of access results
from viewpoint- and content-neutral reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions.14 TPM restrictions, aggressively applied, can reduce the space
available quite considerably-to a small circle or two within a major public
park, such as the St. Louis Arch, in downtown St. Louis, Missouri. 14 2
Thus, the problem is two-fold: Federal courts too easily permit the
government to adopt self-serving classifications of public property that banish
protesters and protest activity. And, even with respect to public property that
cannot be entirely closed to speech activity, the government may adopt
burdensome, and highly effective, regulations that severely limit the availability
of the property for First Amendment activities. In the days of the Warren and
Burger Courts, neither of these propositions held true. Government property was
presumptively available for speech activity, and the government had to establish
why its proposed use for speech activity constituted too great a burden for the
government to shoulder. 143 Moreover, federal courts viewed efforts to
aggressively limit use of traditional public forums to prevent speech activity
with skepticism. Cox v. Louisianal44 provides a good example-if government
138 Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897).
139 Compare Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09
(1969) (holding that public school students may engage in political protest activity while on
school district property), with Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 1145, 1150, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a federal statute that bans protest on the large,
elevated marble plaza located in front of the United States Supreme Court because of "the
government's long-recognized interests in preserving decorum in the area of a courthouse
and in assuring the appearance (and actuality) ofajudiciary uninfluenced by public opinion
and pressure").
140
See supra notes 108-31 and accompanying text.
141 See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 ("[T]he government may impose reasonable restrictions
on the time, place, or manner of protected speech . . . .").
142
See United States v. Kistner, 68 F.3d 218, 221-22 (8th Cir. 1995).
143
See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
144 See generally Cox v. Louisiana (Cox 1), 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana (Cox
II), 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
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officials authorized a protest on one side of a public street proximate to a county
courthouse, then they could not object to the use of sidewalks on the opposite
side of the street. 14 5
To permit a mass protest near a courthouse, on an as applied basis in the
context of a state law that sought to protect judges and court officials from
improper influences, constitutes a remarkable commitment to securing and
advancing First Amendment values. So too, ordering military officials to permit
protest activity on a military base represents a strikingly broad, and deep,
commitment to facilitating the process of democratic deliberation that is
essential to the maintenance of democratic self-government. 146 Although the
Burger Court ultimately declined to extend its initial ruling mandating access to
military bases for speech activity, 147 it did so in an opinion that did not declare,
in categorical terms, that such facilities may be closed entirely to the public and
declared free speech-free zones. 14 8 Indeed, the Burger Court even declined to
adopt a categorical approach to declaring a prison off limits to any and all forms
of expressive activity. 149
The Warren and Burger Courts essentially treated the First Amendment as
a -font of affirmative, positive obligations on the government to lend its
assistance to would-be speakers through selective access to government-owned
property. The government could not pick and choose which speakers and
messages it would lend its support in the form of access to public propertyinstead it had a duty to facilitate all comers. To be sure, this approach had the
effect of significantly increasing the social cost of speech activity on public
property.1 50 When half of a major U.S. highway is used for a major civil rights
protest, rather than for vehicular traffic, drivers seeking to use the highway to
get from Point A to Point B incur a nontrivial cost.1 51 So too, the use of public
spaces for speech activity makes the space less available for other activities-if
a group ofNew Age women descend upon the interior of the Jefferson Memorial
to dance, the quietude of the interior space is disrupted for those who simply
wish to contemplate the neo-classical interior and massive sculpture of
Jefferson. 152
The same, however, could be said of having Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
speak at the rally associated with the iconic August 27-28, 1963, March on
Washington for Jobs and Freedom, from the interior space of the Lincoln
14 5
14 6

Cox II, 379 U.S. at 562, 569-70, 574-75.
See Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197, 197-98 (1972) (per curiam).

14 7 See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976).
14 8

See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
1 50 See Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 109 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
151See id at 106-12.
152
But cf Oberwetter v. Hilliard, 639 F.3d 545, 552-54 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding a
government ban on protest within the interior of the Jefferson Memorial because it does not
constitute a "public forum" and the regulations were content- and viewpoint-neutral and
otherwise "reasonable").
149
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Memorial, to the mass audience attending the rally on the National Mall, and
also those persons watching King's speech live on broadcast television. 153
Should the government be free to banish protests from both spaces? On the
theory that they exist solely for reverential contemplation of Jefferson and
Lincoln-rather than expressive activities associated with political, ideological,
or religious beliefs?
The Warren and Burger Courts were willing to force government entities to
justify refusals of access to public property with persuasive reasons that
demonstrated the incompatibility of speech activity with the more regular uses
of public property. Moreover, during this era, the Supreme Court also
entertained "as applied" challenges to speech restrictions that were otherwise
valid on their face-such as proscriptions against efforts to bring extra-judicial
pressure to bear on state court judges and court personnel. 154 In sum, the federal
courts routinely pushed the government to facilitate speech by making public
property available for First Amendment activities.
The contemporary First Amendment demands much less of the government
with respect to making public property available for private speech. To be sure,
the government is free to make property available for speech activity, but it has
a much narrower obligation to do so-both with respect to the kind of property
it must open to expressive activities and with respect to the terms and conditions
it imposes on private citizens who wish to use public property for protest.' 55 Of
course, if a would-be speaker owns the property necessary to speak, and
therefore does not require access to government property as a locus for their
speech, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have aggressively protected the right
of private property owners to use their property for expressive purposes. 156
The public forum doctrine was firmly established by the final years of the
Burger Court 57 and ossified quickly under the Rehnquist Court. 158 Over forty
153

Dr. King gave his iconic I Have a Dream speech at the mass outdoor rally on the
National Mall-a rally that served as the capstone for this event and constituted a pivotal
moment in the nation's long struggle to secure basic civil rights and equal citizenship for all.
See
OFFICIAL
PROGRAM
FOR
THE
MARCH
ON
WASHINGTON
(1963),
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash-true&doc-96
[https://perma.cc/2BPNPFR3]; see also Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream Address at the Lincoln Memorial
(Aug. 28, 1963), reprinted in MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE
ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 217,217-20 (James Melvin Washington
ed., 1986).
154 See Cox v. Louisiana (Cox II), 379 U.S. 559, 568-75 (1965).
15 5 See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726-27, 737 (1990).
156 Compare City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54-55 (1994) (invalidating a ban on
the placement of lawn signs on private residential property bearing political or ideological
messages), with Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727-30 (upholding a postal service regulation banning
leafletting on postal service property).
1 57 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
158 See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-79 (1992)
(holding that airport concourses do not constitute public forums and, therefore, government
may adopt and apply any reasonable restrictions on speech activity on airport grounds).
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years later, calling for the Supreme Court to abandon completely the public
forum doctrine is likely to be unsuccessful. Moreover, it is hardly surprising that
the federal courts would prefer categorical rules that permit the easy and
consistent disposition of litigation that seeks access to government property for
speech activity to an open-ended balancing test that requires courts to reconsider
the availability of public property for speech activity on a case-by-case and ad
hoc basis. Accordingly, calling for a return to the open-ended balancing
approach of Brown v. Louisiana will not prove to be a successful strategy for
making more public property reliably available for First Amendment
activities. 159
A more realistic alternative to a wholesale repudiation of the public forum
doctrine would entail finding a mechanism for improving on the existing public
forum framework. Happily, there are some potential improvements that could
shift the burden from would-be protesters to prove a constitutional right of
access to public property to the government to establish a clear legal right to
deny access to particular property. Indeed, some areas of First Amendment law
already work in this fashion-for example, the government generally must
prove that the risk of violence associated with speech activity is so clear and
present a danger that it justifies silencing an unpopular speaker. 160 We do not
allow the government to establish categorical rules that certain kinds of highly
unpopular speech may be proscribed because of a risk of unrest or violence; by
parity of reasoning we should be more willing to require the government to show
that providing access to particular kinds of government property would be
unduly disruptive to government operations.
It also bears noting that the rule against silencing an unpopular speaker
because of the potential for public disorder, or even violence, also imposes
significant financial burdens on the government, on an entirely involuntary
basis, and effectively forces the government to expend scarce resources in order
to facilitate speech activity in public spaces.161 Police budgets are not infinite
and the costs of policing radically unpopular speakers could be quite significant.
Yet, under the First Amendment, the government may not invoke the cost of
providing protection to unpopular speakers as a basis for requiring them to cease
speaking.1 62 In this sense, the First Amendment creates a positive duty on the
government to facilitate private speech. Moreover, this aspect of the First
Amendment constitutes well-settled law.1 63 Access to public property through
1 59 See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966).
160 See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973) (per curiam); Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949).
161 See Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 109 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
162
See Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-36 (1992).
163
See Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4; see also Forsyth Cry., 505 U.S. at 133-36 (finding
government ordinance basing permit fee on content of message facially invalid); Gregory v.
City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 111-12 (1969) (invalidating convictions for disorderly
conduct based on a hostile crowd reaction to an entirely peaceful protest march and holding
that a "peaceful and orderly" march comes within "the sphere of conduct protected by the
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a free speech easement is simply another form of involuntary speech subsidythe question that federal judges must ask and answer is the degree to which
government entities should possess discretion to deny this subsidy to would-be
speakers.
The main virtue of the pre-public forum doctrine era cases was a functional
approach to determining whether public property could be used for First
Amendment activities.16 Rather than relying on the government's (potentially
self-serving) labels for particular property or even on the government's declared
purpose for owning property, the federal courts would instead consider the kinds
of activities the government permitted voluntarily and the consistency, or
inconsistency, of speech, assembly, petition, and association-related activities
in those spaces. Even if the Supreme Court retains the public forum framework,
the question of whether a space constitutes a traditional or designated public
forum could be determined using a functional approach, rather than a formalistic
historical approach that would exclude many important public spaces from use
for protest simply because the spaces did not exist in 1791 (for example, an
airport or train station).1 6 5
First Amendment values would be better advanced if more government
property were available for use by private citizens seeking to engage their fellow
First Amendment" despite a hostile audience reaction); Note, Freedom of Speech and
Assembly: The Problem of the Hostile Audience, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 1118, 1118, 1122-23
(1949) (describing, discussing, and analyzing the then-"relatively neglected" problem of
permitting a hostile audience's reaction to serve as a basis for silencing speech and proposing
that speech should not be proscribed if it is otherwise "independently lawful").
164See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972) (using a functional
approach focused on "the nature of a place" to determine whether it may be used for public
protest activity). Justice Marshall emphasized that "[t]he crucial question is whether the
manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place
at a particular time." Id. at 116.
1 65 See id It also bears noting that Justice Kennedy has argued strongly in favor of using
a functional approach to public forum analysis rather than a rigid historical approach. See
Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 693-94 (1992) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) ("Our public forum doctrine ought not to be a jurisprudence of categories
rather than ideas or convert what was once an analysis protective of expression into one
which grants the government authority to restrict speech by fiat."). Kennedy posited that "the
Court's public forum analysis in these cases is inconsistent with the values underlying the
Speech and Press Clauses of the First Amendment." Id. at 694. He objected that the
majority's approach "leaves the government with almost unlimited authority to restrict
speech on its property by doing nothing more than articulating a nonspeech-related purpose
for the area, and it leaves almost no scope for the development of new public forums absent
the rare approval of the government." Id at 695. In his view, the determination of whether
government property constitutes a public forum "must be an objective one, based on the
actual, physical characteristics and uses of the property." Id Thus, Justice Kennedy's
approach would consider the actual day-to-day uses of government property rather than the
label that the government attaches to particular property. Applying this approach, he
concluded that an airport concourse constitutes a public forum. Id at 697-703. Justice
Kennedy's approach is consistent with the approach of the Warren and Burger Courts in
cases like Brown, Pell, and Greer. See supra notes 14-25 and accompanying text.
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citizens over matters of public concern. A more contextualized, functional
approach to identifying public forums would open up more public property for
speech activity without forcing federal judges to reinvent the wheel every time
a would-be protester seeks access to government property that cannot be
regularly used for speech activity without undermining or precluding the
government from maintaining its regular operations. I do not propose returning
generically to an open-ended balancing exercise-instead, I propose revising
the definitional exercise to consider more carefully actual uses of government
property rather than the label affixed to a particular place.
To the extent that the government permits property to be used by the public
for activities that are not much different from leafletting or fixed pickets, it
should not be permitted to close the property to would-be speakers who seek to
engage in expressive activity protected under the First Amendment. For
example, if a government building features a courtyard generally open to the
public, and through which members of the general public may pass, linger, or
sit, it seems easy enough to permit someone to linger or sit while wearing a tshirt with a political message or holding a sign. The disruption caused by
someone occupying space within the courtyard while drinking a cup of coffee
or reading a newspaper is essentially, if not exactly, the same. Thus, if a
government-owned space is otherwise open to the public for one set of activities
(i.e., drinking coffee or reading a newspaper), the public space also should be
open for speech activity that is no more disruptive.
Declaring public property otherwise open to any and all members of the
public to be a nonpublic forum, and thereby closing it to all forms of expressive
activity, should not be an available option.1 66 The federal courts should deny the
government the power to pick and choose arbitrarily what public property will
be deemed suitable for speech activity regardless of the actual characteristics,
and regular day-to-day uses of the property, that the government actually
permits. 167 If the Boston Common is open to those who wish to stroll, exercise,
or read, then it should be equally open to those who wish to brandish political
signs.1 68
On the other hand, and by way of contrast, a city water treatment plant is
closed to the public for all purposes and, accordingly, closing it to speech
activity would be constitutionally unobjectionable. If the government closes
166

But cf Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 1145, 1157-62 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (declaring a large
plaza in front of the U.S. Supreme Court a "non-public forum" and sustaining, against a First
Amendment
challenge, a federal law banning all First Amendment activity within the plaza).
167
But see id at 1160-62 (holding constitutionally irrelevant the Supreme Court's
tolerance of expressive activity on the plaza by lawyers and litigants presenting oral
arguments to the Supreme Court, in addition to selective enforcement of the ban with respect
to some protests by non-litigants because the Supreme Court's approach to doling out access
to a nonpublic forum need only be "reasonable" and these practices of limited use were not
self-evidently unreasonable).
1 6 8 Cf Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 46-47 (1897) (upholding a ban on protest
activity within the Boston Common, even though the property was generally open to
members of the public).
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property to the public for all purposes, it is far less likely to be engaged in an
effort to burden or squelch protected speech activity. When the government
targets expressive activity for disfavored treatment, however, the federal courts
should react with a healthy degree of skepticism about the government's
motives-and their consistency with the First Amendment.1 69 If assessing
motive seems a difficult task for courts, 170 simply applying a functional
approach would avoid difficult exercises in ascertaining the government's
purpose in closing public property to speech activity. To state the point more
directly, the actual and everyday uses of government property, rather than a
government-affixed label or the historical origins of the particular kind of
property, should control the First Amendment analysis and outcome.
Second, federal courts should be more receptive to as applied challenges to
denials of access to particular property and also to TPM regulations. Even if the
government may constitutionally close certain categories of public property to
speech activity, federal courts should nevertheless consider whether, on a
particular set of facts, the First Amendment requires mandated access for a
1 69 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, ProducingSpeech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1029, 1061-64
(2015) (discussing the reasons for applying strict scrutiny to content-based speech
regulations, noting that "content-based laws are of greater constitutional concern than
content-neutral laws," and explaining that "strict scrutiny generally applies to content-based
laws because the Court is highly suspicious of the proposition that particular messages can
cause social harm"). Professor Bhagwat argues that even when a valid regulatory interest
seems tojustify a content-based speech regulation, such as Los Angeles County, California's
ban on the production of so-called bareback pornography, see id at 1044-46, 1070-72,
courts should still be skeptical about the government and its actual motives for seeking to
suppress speech. See id at 1064 (arguing that even under intermediate scrutiny review of
regulations that burden speech "it is important that such scrutiny not be excessively
deferential to the government," with particular consideration of whether "the effect of the
law is to completely eliminate particular content, as opposed to merely limit its creation").
170 Compare U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (declining to assess
Congress's real purposes in enacting a statute when the statute's language bears a clear plain
meaning because of the difficulties in ascertaining legislative purpose and explaining that
"we have historically assumed that Congress intended what it enacted"), and Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-26 (1971) (claiming, contrary to well-established case law,
that "no case in this Court has held that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely
because of the motivations of the men who voted for it" and arguing that "there is an element
of futility in a judicial attempt to invalidate a law because of the bad motives of its
supporters"), with Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
534, 540-41 (1993) (explaining that "facial neutrality is not determinative" of a law's
constitutionality and holding that a reviewing court must consider "among other things, the
historical background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of events leading
to the enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history,
including contemporaneous statements made by members of the decisionmaking body"), and
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228-32 (1985) (invalidating a facially race-neutral
1901 Alabama state constitutional provision that stripped certain felons of their voting rights
because "zeal for white supremacy ran rampant at the convention" that enacted the provision
and this improper discriminatory motive rendered the provision inconsistent with the Equal
Protection Clause).
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particular group of speakers because of a nexus between the speakers and their
message and the space at issue.17 1
Indeed, one could read Brown v. Louisiana narrowly as permitting the
particular protest in the local library because a silent protest did not disrupt other
uses of the library and because the protest targeted the operation of the library
on a racially segregated basis. 172 In other words, a different kind of protest,
seeking to call attention to a different cause wholly unrelated to the public
library, might not enjoy First Amendment protection.1 73 The government's
ability to deny access to its property depended on the burden the protest imposed
on the government's ability to achieve its objectives and also on the relationship
of the speech to the venue. 174 Even if most forms of protest, and most protesters,
could not demand to use a public library's circulation desk area for a political
protest, the civil rights protesters, engaged in a silent protest of the racially
segregated operation of that specific public library, stood on different First
Amendment ground.1 75
So too, Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr.'s order in Williams v. Wallacel 76
plainly takes into account the nature of the protest and the nexus between the
forum and the speakers.1 77 Even if most protesters could not routinely
commandeer a federal highway for a multi-day, fifty-two mile march, the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), in response to a massive
state-wide effort to suppress the voting rights of African-American citizens,
possessed a qualitatively different kind of claim that justified greater access to
public property than the First Amendment would ordinarily require.1 78 Simply
put, a different First Amendment analysis-and outcome-should and did
occur. 179

Judge Johnson considered carefully the petitioning cast of the proposed
speech activity and the legal responsibility of state and local officials for serious
constitutional deprivations of basic civil and political rights before issuing an
171 See generally TIMOTHY ZICK,

SPEECH OUT OF

DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST

AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES (2009).

172 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-43 (1966).
173
See id at 142-43.
I74 See id

175 Id.
176 Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
177
See id at 106-09.
178 See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 78, at 185-207; see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.,
Could a Selma-Like Protest Happen Today? Probably Not, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2015),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0308-krotoszynski-selma-march-protestdoctrine-20150308-story.html [https://perma.cc/9C9L-MUJ7].
179
See KROTOSZYNSKI, supranote 78, at 200 (noting that "[t]he proportionality principle
permits courts to make rational distinctions between proposed uses of public forums for
speech activities," explaining that this principle "permits most groups to be relegated to less
busy corridors but holds out the possibility of using major highways and byways under
sufficiently compelling circumstances," and positing that it "permits courts to match venues
for speech activities with the speaker's need to speak and the community's need to hear").
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injunctive order permitting the march to proceed as proposed. 8 0 Both the
identity of the speakers and the relationship of the speech to the particular forum
18
factored very heavily into Judge Johnson's First Amendment analysis.s
To be sure, considering a speaker's identity and message does involve
content-, and perhaps even viewpoint-, based factors. It might seem
counterintuitive to use a speaker- and content-based screen to determine access
to public property for speech activity. However, upon more careful reflection,
these objections are not fatal flaws and do not doom this approach to granting
targeted access to public property to some speakers but not to others. As I have
previously argued, "Judge Johnson was correct to recognize enhanced rights of
access to public property for petitioning speech seeking a redress of grievances
from the government entity being both petitioned and protested against through
the same hybrid petitioning activity."1 82
First, and most important, the public forum doctrine already permits the
government itself to limit access to public property for speech based on the
would-be speaker and her message.1 83 The entire concept of a limited-purpose
public forum entails the government creating a forum accessible by some
speakers, and for some messages, but not others. 184 If the government may limit
access to forums based on the would-be speakers' identities and the content of
their proposed speech, and federal courts are competent to assess the fair
enforcement of such restrictions, it seems implausible to say that "as applied"
access to public property cannot work. If courts are capable of superintending
forum access limits in the context of limited-purpose public forums, then they
are also capable of considering "as applied" requests for access to nonpublic
forums or under terms and conditions that violate otherwise constitutionally
valid TPM regulations. The federal courts have not signaled any problems with
the creation of limited-purpose public forums; if speaker-based and messagebased limits are capable ofjudicial implementation in this context, then identical
considerations in the context of nonpublic forums should be equally feasible.
Second, First Amendment doctrine is rife with content-based distinctions.
Pornography and commercial speech receive less robust First Amendment

180 Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 106-11.
18 1
See id at 106-09.
182
KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 78, at 186; see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Essay,
Celebrating Selma: The Importance of Context in Public Forum Analysis, 104 YALE L.J.
1411, 1414 (1995) (noting that "[ajlthough the specific circumstances that led Judge Johnson
to embrace the proportionality principle in 1965 are, thankfully, long gone, the problem of
ensuring that adequate public space is available to accommodate meaningful social protest
remains" and suggesting that "[p]roperly understood and carefully limited, the
proportionality principle can continue to help vindicate democratic values today, just as it
did. . . in Selma").
183 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
1 84 See Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679, 685 (2010); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
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protection than political speech.18 5 In order to apply content-based rules of this
sort, federal judges must ascertain the content of the speech and place it within
one category or another. 186 If federal courts can determine whether speech is
commercial or political in nature,1 87 then they are also quite capable of
determining whether a nexus exists between a particular government-owned
88
property and a proposed protest that would take place on that property.'
Suppose, for example, that military police on an army base shoot and kill an
unarmed intruder found on base property. Suppose further that allegations of
racial bias arise within the community as a possible motive for the shooting. Is
it unthinkable that the base commander might have to make base property
available for protest activity on these facts, even if the base is not otherwise
available as a locus for expressive activities? Moreover, would it vest federal
judges with too much discretion to engage in the kind of analysis that would
allow a local civil rights organization to stage a march that crosses base property
185

Compare Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452-53 (2011) (holding that "speech on
public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is
entitled to special protection"); and Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010)
(opining that "[t]he First Amendment "'has its fullest and most urgent application" to speech
uttered during a campaign for political office"') (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent.
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)), with Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980) (noting that multiple precedents "have recognized
the commonsense distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which
occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of
speech" (internal quotations omitted) and holding that such speech is "therefore accord[ed]
a lesser protection . . . than ... other constitutionally guaranteed expression"), andMiller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973) (observing that "[t]he First and Fourteenth
Amendments have never been treated as absolutes" and upholding the constitutional power
of the state and federal governments to regulate, or even proscribe, obscene speech).
186 See, e.g., Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509, 513-15 (7th Cir. 2014).
187
See id at 517-20, 522.
188
See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85
COLUM. L. REv. 449, 452-56 (1985) (arguing that the federal courts should seek to protect
jealously the central "core" of the First Amendment to ensure that it functions effectively as
a check on the suppression of dissent-and dissenters-in times of national crisis); William
Van Alstyne, Essay, Remembering Melville Nimmer: Some Cautionary Notes on
CommercialSpeech, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1640-43, 1646-48 (1996) (arguing that First
Amendment doctrine can, and should, be nimble enough to draw meaningful distinctions
between different kinds of speech and to afford political speech related to the process of
democratic self-government a higher measure of constitutional protection than other kinds
of speech). Both Professors Blasi and Van Alstyne argue that courts can, and should, use
content-based metrics to afford some speech differential, favorable treatment because the
speech relates to the central purposes of the First Amendment. I do not mean to minimize
the real risks associated with judicial discretion and the protection of unpopular speakers and
speech. Even so, however, if one posits that existing access to public spaces for expressive
activity would remain in place, the risks associated with providing enhanced access to public
property in some instances should be manageable. Moreover, as previously noted, see supra
notes 184-87 and accompanying text, existing First Amendment doctrine, particularly the
limited-purpose public forum doctrine, already relies on speaker and content-based
metrics-but does not seem to cause federal courts serious difficulties with implementation.
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without requiring the base to be open to any and all would-be protesters? The
answers to these questions are quite obvious-if we truly view freedom of
speech as integral to the process of democratic deliberation and government
accountability, then a federal court faced with a lawsuit seeking an injunction
that orders the base commander to facilitate a protest march on base property
should not be resolved with a two-line order that tersely states that a military
base is not a public forum.
Finally, one might reasonably ask, in the era of the internet, if silence on the
street corner, to use Professor Owen Fiss's wonderful and apt metaphor, really
matters. 189 The short answer: It does. A speaker who wishes to use one modality
of speech should not be relegated to another; just as the government may not
order speakers to engage-or refrain from engaging-in speech featuring a
particular viewpoint or content, 190 the First Amendment should also prohibit the
government from regulating the particular modality of speech that a would-be
speaker may use to communicate her message.1 9 1
Other reforms in the application of the TPM doctrine could also help to
create and sustain needed breathing room for the exercise of expressive
freedoms in public places. The federal courts should apply the content-neutrality
requirement in a more demanding fashion and not simply accept the facial
neutrality of a speech regulation as sufficient to establish that the regulation
passes the first prong of the Ward test. 192 In cases like Hill v. Colorado,193 the
federal courts have been highly credulous of government claims that speech
regulations were content-neutral, even when the facts and circumstances
surrounding the adoption of the TPM regulations strongly suggest a government
purpose to silence a particular speaker or message.1 94 In other contexts, such as
ferreting out discrimination based on racel 95 or religious belief,1 96 the federal
courts make a serious effort to ascertain the real or actual purpose of a faciallyneutral enactment. 197 This same methodological approach should be deployed
to assess content-neutrality when applying the Ward test. 198

1 89 Fiss, supra note 6, at 1408.
1 90 See Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
1 9 1 See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143-45 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 92
147, 162 (1939).
1 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790-91 (1989).
193 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000).
1 94 See id at 719-20, 723. The Hill majority went so far as to claim that a ban on protest
outside abortion clinics was not even a regulation of "speech" but merely of "conduct." Id.
at 719 ("Rather, it is a regulation of the places where some speech may occur."). This
approach has the effect of rendering any and all TPM regulations content neutral because
they too only seek to regulate "the places where some speech may occur." Id.
195 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228-32 (1985).
196 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534, 54041(1993).
197 See, e.g., Hunter, 471 U.S. at 228-32.
1 9 8 See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 78, at 28-30.
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Second, the federal courts should press the government to provide an actual
reason for the creation and enforcement of TPM regulations-rather than simply
accept vague assertions that particular TPM regulations advance an important
government interest. In this regard, federal judges should not blithely credit
highly generalized invocations of security concerns as a basis for banishing
dissent from public spaces.1 99 At present, however, courts are inclined to be
extremely deferential to government invocations of security and public safety
rationales for speech bans on public property and to require very little in the way
of "narrow tailoring" to achieve the government's important or substantial
purpose. 200
Third, and finally, the ample alternative channels of communication prong
of the Ward test should take into account whether the available alternative
means of communication are likely to permit the would-be speaker to reach the
same audience no less reliably, effectively, and efficiently than through a public
protest. For example, a protest of a NATO meeting proximate to the meeting
venue for a group of NATO officials is far more likely to be heard and seen-by
NATO officials than a random blog post or Tweet. 201 At present, however, this
aspect of the Ward test does not take into account the efficacy of the alternative
means of communication in reaching the speaker's preferred audience. 202 As
the saying goes, if a tree falls in the forest, and no one sees it, the event might
as well not have happened. What is true of trees falling in forests holds doubly
true of public protest aimed at engaging the general citizenry to support or
oppose particular government policies and actions. 203
These reforms in the application of the Wardtest for TPM regulations would
substantially improve the application of existing doctrine and would materially
shift the burden to the government to justify refusals to make public property
that admittedly comprises a public forum available for speech activity.
However, and as I have argued previously, 2 04 a more general and systematic

199

See id at 31-50 (discussing the many cases in which the lower federal courts have
reflexively credited the government's claim that draconian limits on public protest were
necessary for reasons of public safety and security); see also Citizens for Peace in Space v.
City of Colo. Springs, 477 F.3d 1212, 1217-21 (10th Cir. 2007).
200
Citizens for Peace in Space, 477 F.3d at 1221 ("While an extremely important
government interest does not dictate the result in time, place, and manner cases, the
significance of the government interest bears an inverse relationship to the rigor of the
narrowly tailored analysis.").
201 See id at 1217-20.
2 02
See BI(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Bos., 378 F.3d 8, 13-14 (1st Cir. 2004).
203
See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 78, at 34 ("The key doctrinal point here is that the
Free Speech and Free Assembly Clauses apparently do not afford any protection to a wouldbe speaker's interest in speaking to a particular audience in real time, even if he seeks to do
so by utilizing a classic traditional public forum, such as a street, side-walk, or park."); see
also Enrique Armijo, The "Ample Alternative Channels" Flaw in First Amendment
Doctrine,
73 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1657, 1682 (2016).
204
See supra notes 166-75 and accompanying text.
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reorientation of First Amendment theory and doctrine is needed in this important
area of law.
Simply put, the Roberts and Rehnquist Courts have been far too solicitous
of the government's unsubstantiated claims of managerial necessity-and have
credited weak, to the point of spurious, claims that speech bans or TPM
regulations are necessary in order for the government to function efficiently.
Resetting the balance in favor of greater access to public property for speech
activity would not seriously endanger or prevent the government from achieving
its legitimate purposes. Nor would it mean that public parks, streets, and
sidewalks would devolve into total chaos as protesters commandeered such
spaces at will. Instead, adopting such theoretical and doctrinal innovations
would help to advance and facilitate broad-based participation in the process of
democratic self-government by ordinary people who lack the ability to use their
own private property to access the marketplace of ideas.
V. CONCLUSION
The right of ordinary citizens to use public property for First Amendment
activities has declined over time from the 1980s to the present. 205 During the
Warren and Burger Court eras, the federal courts were much more willing to
require the government to facilitate private speech by ordering access to
government-owned property for First Amendment activities. 20 6 The First
Amendment gave rise to a positive right of access-a free speech easement-to
public property. 207 Beginning in the early 1980s, and accelerating into the
1990s, the Supreme Court retreated from this commitment in favor of granting
the government considerably broader discretion to manage public property as it
thinks best. 208
To be sure, the Supreme Court is unlikely to jettison the public forum
doctrine at this point in time. Simply put, too much water has flowed under the
doctrinal bridge. The perfect, however, should not be the enemy of the merely
good-or in this instance, the better. It would be possible to modify the
operation of the public forum doctrine to shift the balance away from unfettered
government discretion to grant or withhold access to public property toward a
model in which the government has to shoulder a higher burden ofjustification
for refusing to make public property available for protest activity. Defining
"public forums" in functional terms, rather than historical terms, would

2 05

See Zick, Expressive Topography, supra note 14, at 447.

206See, e.g., Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 107-09 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
2 07
Zick, Expressive Topography, supra note 14, at 445.
2 08
See Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 1145, 1150, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (rejecting a First
Amendment challenge to a federal statute that bans protest on the large, elevated marble
plaza located in front of the United States Supreme Court because of "the government's longrecognized interests in preserving decorum in the area of a courthouse and in assuring the
appearance (and actuality) ofa judiciary uninfluenced by public opinion and pressure").
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constitute a good first start.209 In addition, the federal courts should signal a
greater willingness to consider "as applied" challenges both to denials of access
to nonpublic forums and also to otherwise-valid TPM regulations of public
forums.
If freedom of speech is a necessary condition for the maintenance of
democratic self-government, then government, at all levels, should be required
to incur costs and inconveniences in order to facilitate democratic deliberation
among the citizenry. Just as the government cannot limit voting rights to those
with a minimum amount of property, the government should not have the
discretion to leave access to the political marketplace of ideas entirely to private
market ordering. I do not suggest that the government should be able to limit, or
level down, the ability of those with property to use their property for speech
activity. But, citizens who wish to protest government policies, like Cindy
Sheehan, 2 10 should not be forced to purchase real property in order to do so
effectively.
It is possible to imagine a limited, affirmative right to use government
property for speech and to adopt a doctrinal framework that fully honors this
baseline commitment to safeguarding democratic deliberation. The Warren and
Burger Courts' open-ended balancing approach might have vested too much
discretion with trial courts and undoubtedly produced inconsistent results in
cases presenting similar facts. Even so, it would be possible to move toward an
Aristotelean "virtuous mean" 2 11 between the extremes of treating the
government as if it were just another private property owner and permitting
citizens to appropriate government property for First Amendment activities
whenever and wherever they choose.
In sum, under the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, the balance has shifted too
far in favor of government discretion to deny would-be speakers access to public
property for protest. A course correction that places a higher burden of
justification on the government for resisting free speech easements on public
property would better serve our core commitment to freedom of expression as
an essential condition for democratic self-government to flourish.

209

See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 693-96, 70103 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (rejecting a categorical, historical approach to analyzing
whether government property constitutes a public forum and proposing instead an openended, contextual, functional approach that would consider the actual day-to-day uses of
particular property).
2 10
See supra note 2.
211 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 42-53, T 1106a5-1109b (Terence Irwin
trans., 1985); see also Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions ofEmotion
in CriminalLaw, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 286-88 (1996) (discussing the Aristotelian notion
of the virtuous mean that lies between problematic extreme forms of behavior that reflect
either a surfeit or a shortage of a particular character trait).

